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Abstract 
With the exception Brander and Drazen (2008), who use a comprehensive cross-country 
database consisting of both developed and developing countries, the hypothesis that rapid 
growth helps incumbents win elections has been tested exclusively for the developed 
countries (e.g., Ray Fair 1978).  But since sustained rapid growth offers the prospect of 
pulling vast numbers of the voters out of poverty within a generation, such an effect is far 
more likely to be present in the developing rather than developed countries.  In this paper, 
we offer the first test of the hypothesis on a large developing and poor country, India, 
which has seen its economy grow 8 to 9 percent recently.  We first generalize the Fair 
model to allow for multiple candidates instead for just two and then test it using cross-
state data.  We find quantitatively large and statistically robust effect of growth on the 
prospects of the candidates of the state incumbent parties to win elections.  Specifically, 
we use the data on 422 candidates in the 2009 parliamentary elections and show that the 
candidates of incumbent parties in high-growth states have much better prospects of 
victory than those in low-growth states.     
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Growth and Election Outcomes in a Developing Country 
Poonam Gupta and Arvind Panagariya 
1. Introduction 
Despite the intuitive appeal of the idea that good economic outcomes such as 
sustained rapid growth should help incumbents win elections, evidence on it has been 
sparse.  With the exception of the United States, scholars have been unable to find such 
effect in the developed countries.  Ray Fair (1978) first found such an effect on the ability 
of the incumbent United States presidents to return to office.  Subsequently, Alberto 
Alesina and Howard Rosenthal (1995) also found a similar effect.  But the other studies 
devoted to answering the same question in other developed countries including G. 
Bingham Powell Jr. and Guy D. Whitten (1993), Paldam (1991), Kaare Strom and 
Seymour M. Lipset (1984) and Lewis-Beck (1988) have failed to find a statistically 
significant effect.  
More recently, Adi Brender and Allan Drazen (2008) have used a comprehensive 
cross-country dataset spanning over 74 developed and developing democratic countries 
and 350 election episodes to examine whether GDP growth during the term in office or 
specifically in the election year help incumbents win elections.  They find that on 
average, growth does help incumbents win elections in the developing but not developed 
countries.  In addition to growth, these authors also assess the impact of loose fiscal 
policy during the term of the incumbent or the election year on the election outcome. 
While the Brender and Drazen study, thus, finds a positive effect of growth on 
election outcomes for the incumbents in the developing countries on average, there 
currently exists no study exclusively devoted to identifying the effect of growth on 
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election outcomes in a developing country.  This is somewhat disappointing since one 
would expect that it is precisely in the poor countries that the electorate most values 
sustained rapid growth.  Moreover, it will also be good to know if democracy and 
development indeed go hand-in-hand as many analysts argue. 
In the present paper, we attempt to fill this important gap by studying the link 
between growth and electoral success in India.  It may be noted at the outset, however, 
that in doing so, we cannot follow the bulk of the literature, which studies the relationship 
between growth and the ability to win elections in the context of the head of the state, 
either the president or prime minister.  Although India is one of a handful of developing 
countries with a virtually unbroken record of democracy for more than 60 years, even it 
has not had enough parliamentary elections to credibly allow us to test the impact of 
growth on prime ministerial outcome.  The difficulty at this level is compounded by the 
fact that during the first four decades, there was very limited variation in the national 
growth rate over time.  Moreover, since the Congress was the only major party at the 
national level at independence, it remained the only viable alternative at the center for the 
first twenty-five years.  Other parties as credible claimants of prime ministerial position 
began to emerge only after the Congress itself split in 1969 and again in 1977. 
Therefore, our approach is to move away from studying the electoral prospects of 
the national leaders and focus, instead, on the members of Lok Sabha, the lower house of 
the parliament.  These members contest elections from constituencies located in different 
states, which in turn exhibit differential growth performance.  It is this variation in state-
level growth that we exploit.  Since the Lok Sabha has 543 members, even a single 
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election yields sufficiently large sample to permit the analysis of the determinants of the 
election outcomes.  
Our central assumption in the paper is that the voter in a constituency views the 
government of the state in which that constituency is located as the entity responsible for 
his economic fortunes relative to his counterparts in other states.  To be sure, the central 
government policies have a bearing on the overall growth but since these policies are 
uniform across states, they do not form a basis of distinction across constituencies.  
Likewise, the local government within the constituency also matters but despite some 
devolution of power to local levels in recent years, the state government remains by far 
the most influential force other than the central government within the Indian federation.  
It is the state government officials who are responsible for the implementation of both the 
central and state level development programs and polices within all constituencies of the 
state.  In terms of his contact with officials, the voter must typically deal with state 
officials; indeed, it is extremely rare for him to see central government officials.   
Under this assumption, if economic performance indeed influences the voter‟s 
behavior, he would reward the candidate nominated by the state incumbent party if it has 
delivered favorable growth outcome and punish him if the opposite is the case.  This 
holds true regardless of whether or not the candidate himself is an outgoing member of 
the parliament.  Incumbency in this conception is defined at the level of the state rather 
than the individual contestant.  As long as the state incumbent party nominates the 
candidate, he is subject to the externality, positive or negative, arising out of the party‟s 
performance in the state.  Under our hypothesis, the electorate rewards the candidates of 
the party of the head of the state, called the Chief Minister, if he delivers good growth 
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outcome and punishes him if the opposite.  This translates in the share of votes received 
by the candidate of the state incumbent party being positively impacted by favorable 
growth outcome. 
The study of the relationship between growth and election outcomes at the level of 
the candidate within the same country has at least two advantages over cross-country 
analysis.  First, by concentrating at the sub-national level within the same country, we are 
able to automatically hold constant some of the variables such as the level of 
development, national policy framework, cultural and environmental factors and the 
nature and length of democracy that may be relevant to election outcomes.  Second, in 
the Indian context, the focus on the candidate allows us to assess the effect of individual 
candidate characteristics such as age, gender, education, pending criminal cases and 
wealth, which are all readily comparable within a country.  Under the current election 
laws, all candidates contesting elections in India are required to file an affidavit with the 
Election Commission of India containing information on these characteristics, which is 
made public.  We painstakingly collect this information and judiciously incorporate it in 
our regressions.
1
 
We carry out our analysis for the 2009 parliamentary election, India‟s fifteenth since 
the adoption of the Constitution.  We expect this election to offer the best prospects for 
identifying the effect of growth on the vote share of the candidate of the state incumbent 
party.  This is because the 2009 election was the first parliamentary election to be 
preceded by a shift in the country‟s growth rate to the miracle-level of 8 to 9 percent.  If 
the voters value growth, they could not have asked for a louder and clearer signal than 
                                                 
1
 The distribution of these characteristics across candidates and eventual winners of elections turns out to 
be an interesting exercise in its own right.  We undertake this task in a companion paper, Gupta and 
Panagariya (2011).  This paper also provides several institutional details relating to Indian elections. 
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during this period.  The poor, who are expected to see significant improvements in their 
fortunes in a rapidly growing economy as they indeed did according to the expenditure 
surveys conducted by the National Sample Survey, happen to vote massively in India.  
Therefore, growth effects on election outcomes are most likely to be present in this 
election.
2
 
The paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2, we outline our main result in its 
simplest but dramatic form.  The result is that growth played a central role in determining 
the fortunes of the candidates of the state incumbent party.  In Section 3, we extend the 
model in Fair (1978) to a multiple-candidate setting.  In its original form, this model 
offers the rationale for estimating a single aggregate equation for the proportion of votes 
received by the incumbent candidate in a direct contest involving only two candidates.  
We extend a special case of this model to allow multiple candidates, which is the norm in 
India: of the 543 contests in the 2009 parliamentary elections in India, everyone involved 
three or more candidates.  In Section 4, we estimate the model and show that the result 
we outline in Section 1 is robust to quantitative assessment.  In Section 5, we conclude 
the paper. 
                                                 
2
 This is in the spirit of Jagdish Bhagwati and Panagariya (2004).  Referring to the lack of reaction to the 
poor economic performance on the part of the voter, who kept returning the Congress to power until the 
late 1980s (except once in 1977 when it voted out the latter in reaction to the emergency rule Mrs. Gandhi 
had imposed beginning in 1975), these authors hypothesize, “Perhaps, when little progress takes place all 
around, the centuries-old Indian fatalism takes over. But when the poor begin improving [as in the post-
reform era], then the „revolution of rising expectations‟ is likely to arise. This is a direct result of the 
perception of real possibilities.”  Elaborating on this revolution of perceived possibilities, they add, “The 
young of India, including children from the lowest classes and castes, have enhanced expectations from 
life; and so do their parents, who vote. And this phenomenon -- of expectations aroused but unfulfilled -- 
has cut across the much exaggerated rural-urban divide.” 
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2. The Key Result: A Quick Preview 
We begin by previewing our main result at the outset. This requires us to make 
more precise our definition of the incumbent party at the level of the state and to define 
the relative economic performance of the states and divide the states into high- medium- 
and low-growth states. We define as the incumbent party the main ruling party in power 
(or two main parties if they shared power) in 2007 and the preceding two or more years. 
This means that if a state legislative assembly election was held in 2008 or 2009 and the 
government changed hands, the outgoing party is still considered the incumbent in that 
state for purposes of the 2009 national elections, held in April and May of that year.  It is 
a plausible assumption that the electorate would not have had enough time to judge the 
performance of a party that has been in power for at most a little more than a year in 
terms of growth.  This is especially true in view of the lags with which policies impact 
outcomes as well as lags in the observation of the changes taking place. In contrast, the 
electorate has had enough opportunity to observe a party that ruled for several years until 
a little more than a year or less prior to the national elections in April-May 2009. 
India has 28 states and 7 Union Territories (UTs) in all.  Among the UTs, only 
Delhi has its proper local administration with its own Chief Minister.  The remaining UTs 
are administered by the center.  Therefore, we include Delhi as a “state” in our sample 
while excluding the remaining six UTs from the analysis.  Among the states, the eight 
northeastern states have a special status with deep involvement of the center in their 
development process.  Likewise, special circumstances apply to the state of Jammu and 
Kashmir.  Therefore, we exclude these nine states from our sample.  Finally, two states, 
Karnataka and Jharkhand, have had multiple changes in the state governments during the 
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relevant period, making the choice of the incumbent government arbitrary.  Therefore, we 
drop them from the sample as well.  This leaves us with a total of 18 states where Delhi is 
counted as a state.  These states account for 422 out of the total of 543 parliamentary 
seats across the country.  
Table A1 in the appendix lists the 18 states (column 1) included in our sample.  
Alongside, it also lists the incumbent party or parties (column 2), year in which the 
incumbent party came to power (column 3) and the years during which it ruled prior to 
2009 (column 4).  Our benchmark case relies on the growth rates calculated during these 
years and are shown in column 6.
3
  But for robustness check, we carry out two alternative 
calculations. First, we calculate the growth rates over a modified set of years that allows 
for the inclusion of a year when the party was in power for at least half of that year and of 
the years since 2004 during which the party ruled the state as a part of a prior term.  
These years and the associated growth rates are shown in columns 5 and 7 of Table A1, 
respectively. Second, we restrict our growth rate calculations to only 2007 and 2008 
regardless of the year in which the party came into power.  These growth rates are shown 
in column 8 of Table A1. Including the benchmark case, we thus calculate the growth 
rates in three different ways as shown in columns 6, 7 and 8 of Table A1. 
For each set of growth calculations, we divide the 18 states into three categories 
exhibiting low, medium and high growth rates. We define the low, medium and high 
growth states in three alternative ways.  First, we arrange the 18 states in declining order 
of the average growth rate and define the top one third states as high growth states, the 
bottom third of the states as low growth states and the remaining ones medium growth 
                                                 
3
 Growth rates correspond to the closest fiscal year which runs from April-March in India. Thus the growth 
rate for, 2.g. 2008 refers to growth during the fiscal year 2009, which runs from April 2008-March 2009.  
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states.  Second, we define the states below the median growth rate as low growth states 
and those above it the high growth states.  In this categorization, we eliminate the 
medium growth category.  Finally, we define the bottom five states as low growth states, 
the top five states as high growth states and the middle eight states as the medium growth 
states. 
Table 1: Simple average of percentage seats won by the candidates of the incumbent 
parties in each growth category 
 
  Low  Medium High 
 
Growth rates 
over precise 
incumbency 
period 
States divided into top, 
middle, and bottom one 
third each 
36 54 90 
Above and below median 42  78 
Top five, bottom five and 
middle states 
39 53 92 
Growth rates 
over slightly 
more 
encompassing 
years  
States divided into top, 
middle, and bottom one 
third each 
50 46 84 
Above and below median 44  75 
Top five, bottom five and 
middle states 
44 55 83 
Growth rates 
over 2007 and 
2008 only 
States divided into top, 
middle, and bottom one 
third each 
47 48 84 
Above and below median 50  69 
Top five, bottom five and 
middle states 
46 53 86 
 
We, thus, have three ways in which we calculate the growth rates and three ways 
in which we define low, medium and high growth category states, yielding nine 
alternative ways to compare the election outcomes in high, medium or low growth rate.  
In each case, we calculate the simple average of the percent of candidates of the 
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incumbent parties winning elections within each growth category of states.  The results 
are shown in Table 1. 
It is evident from the pattern in Table 1 that no matter how we define the period 
of incumbency for the purpose of calculating growth rates or how we choose the dividing 
line between low, medium and high growth states, candidates of the incumbent party do 
better in high growth states than those in medium- and low-growth states.  Moreover, 
with one exception, medium-growth states consistently do better than low-growth states.  
Under every classification, 69 percent or more of the candidates of the incumbent parties 
in high growth states win elections.  Maximally, the percentage reaches 92.  In contrast, 
the best the candidates of the incumbent parties in low growth states do is to win 50 
percent of the seats.  High growth seems to confer a distinct advantage on the candidates 
of incumbent parties.  In the remainder of the paper, we subject this basic result to a more 
careful quantitative assessment.   
3. Justifying an Aggregate Equation in Multiple-candidates Setting 
In his pioneering paper on growth and election outcomes, Fair (1978) identifies two 
theories of voter behavior. In the first theory, which according to Gerald H. Kramer 
(1971) appears in classical democratic theory and also resembles the view of George J. 
Stigler (1973), the voter evaluates the current pronouncements and past performances of 
the competing parties and uses these evaluations to form her expected utility under each 
party.  She then votes for the party under which her expected utility is maximized.  In the 
second theory, stressed by Kramer (1971), a voter votes for the incumbent party if its 
performance by some metric has been satisfactory but against it otherwise.  In this latter 
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case, the voter does not evaluate the performance of the parties other than the incumbent 
party at all. 
Fair provides a formalization of the first theory, which encompasses the second 
theory as a special case.  This theory provides a neat basis of estimation of a single 
aggregate equation of the proportion of votes received by the incumbent as a function of 
the relative performance evaluations of the competing parties.  From our perspective, the 
theory has one important limitation, however: it applies to situations involving only a 
direct contest between two parties or candidates.  While the theory works well for the 
problem of the United States presidential elections on which Fair focuses, it proves 
inadequate for us because none of the contests represented in our data has less than three 
candidates. 
It turns out, however, that it is possible to extend the Fair model to three or more 
candidates provided we restrict ourselves to the second of the two models mentioned 
above, which Kramer emphasizes.  This extension allows us to derive an aggregate 
equation for the proportion of votes received by the incumbent party, which is precisely 
what we are concerned with.  In the following, we undertake this task of extending the 
special case of the Fair model in which the voter collects information on the incumbent 
party alone and decides to vote for or against it. 
Consider a potential voter i in constituency c.  For simplicity of exposition, we 
assume that the only “performance” related information the voter gathers relates to the 
growth rate in the state in which the constituency is located relative to the average 
national growth rate.  Information gathered along any other dimensions can be 
incorporated in a straightforward fashion.  The voter also attaches a prior utility to each 
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candidate including that of the incumbent party that is invariant to any present or past 
performance variables. 
We let candidate 1 denote the candidate of the state incumbent party throughout.  
Other candidates are denoted 2, 3, … etc.  We hypothesize that the expected utility of 
voter i from choosing candidate 1, 2, 3, … etc in constituency c is 
(1) Uci
1
 = ci
1
 + 1(gc – g*) + 2DN
 
(2) Uci
2
 = ci
2 
(3) Uci
3
 = ci
3
 
The ci
j
 (j = 1, 2, 3, …) represent the voter‟s measure of utility from electing candidate j 
independently of performance or other considerations (based on personality, caste and 
other considerations).  We index candidates 2, 3, … in the declining order of the ci
j
 (j = 
2, 3, …). This ranking may vary across voters.  Therefore, it is important to remember 
that indexes 2, 3, … etc do not identify specific candidates but are generically the most to 
least liked candidates by voter i from amongst candidates other than 1. 
Variables gc and g* stand for the growth rate in the constituency (represented by 
that in the state in our case) and the average growth rate across all constituencies (the 
national average growth rate).  Therefore, the voter is more favorably inclined toward the 
candidate of the incumbent party the higher the growth rate the party has delivered during 
its incumbency period.  DN is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if candidate 1 also 
belongs to the national incumbent party and zero otherwise. This term is introduced to 
illustrate how we could enrich the basic model by incorporating alternative determinants 
of the voter behavior.  We can include the impact of candidate 1 belonging to another 
party (e.g., the national opposition party) in a similar fashion.  The voter votes for the 
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candidate under whose regime she expects to receive the highest utility.  Subtracting (2) 
from (1), we have: 
(4) Uci
1
 - Uci
2
  = 1(gc – g*) + 2DN - [ ci
2
 - ci
1
] 
      kc - ci 
Here we define  
(5a) ci  ci
2
 - ci
1
 and  
(5b) kc   1(gc – g*) + 2DN 
Parameter ci is a measure of the voter‟s bias against candidate 1 relative to candidate 2 
on the basis of considerations other than those we explicitly incorporate in kc.  Note that 
kc is constant for a constituency.  In particular, it is independent of voter i.  Thus, we are 
assuming that all voters within constituency c value the growth advantage of the state and 
the association of the state incumbent party candidate to the national incumbent party 
equally. 
Voter i votes for or against candidate 1 as kc- ci is positive or negative (we 
ignore the borderline case).  Formally, we can record her vote as: 
(6) Vci
1
 = 1 if kc > ci  
Vci
1
 = 0 if  kc < ci 
That is to say, voter i votes for candidate 1 if and only if growth and other favorable 
effects more than offset her initial bias against the latter.   
The final step is to determine the proportion of votes going to candidate 1, the 
candidate of the incumbent party.  Assume that c, the bias against the candidate of the 
incumbent party relative to the next best candidate, is uniformly distributed between a+ c 
and b+ c where a is negative and b is positive.  Note that a and b are the same across 
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constituencies with only c varying.  The problem is now entirely identical to the one 
solved by Fair (1978).   
Therefore, the distribution of voters above corresponds to that in Figure 1 in Fair 
(1978).  The lower the value of c, the more the voters are inherently favorably inclined 
toward candidate 1 in constituency c.  The probability density function and cumulative 
density function of  (with subscript c dropped) are given in equations (7a) and (7b), 
respectively, below: 
(7a) ccc δb  α  δafor     
ab
1
    ) α (f   
fc( ) = 0 otherwise 
(7b) Fc( ) = 0 for  < a+ c 
  cc
c
c δb  α  δafor     
ab
δaα
    )(F  
 Fc( ) = 1 for  > b+ c 
Let Vc
1
 denote the percent of votes received by candidate 1 in constituency c.  Vc
1
 equals 
the probability that  is less than or equal to kc.  If kc is halfway between a+ c and b+ c, 
half of the voters vote for candidate 1 and the remaining half for one of the remaining 
ones.  The probability that  is less than or equal to kc is simply the value of the 
cumulative density function at kc.  Therefore, 
(8) Vc
1
 = 
ab
δ
ab
k
ab
a cc      
Or, substituting from (5b) and redefining the fractions in the above appropriately, we can 
rewrite (8) as 
(8‟) Vc
1
 = 0 + 1 1(gc – g*) + 1 2DN + c 
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The last term may be interpreted as representing the characteristics of the incumbent 
candidate such as age, sex, education, wealth and pending criminal charges, if any. 
A diagrammatic interpretation of the above may be given as follows.  Normalize 
the total number of voters to 1 and arrange voters from the one with greatest inherent bias 
in favor of candidate 1 to that with the lowest bias; i.e., in the declining order of - ci (= 
ci
1
 - ci
2
).  The curve labeled - ci in Figure 1 shows this relationship.  Absent growth 
and other effects, voters up to point A will vote for candidate 1.  The rest would vote for 
one of the remaining candidates.  This may or may not be sufficient to win the election.  
Adding the advantage conferred by growth and national incumbency (we assume it to be 
positive for the specific constituency considered in Figure 1 above), candidate 1 gets 
votes up to B, which may give him or her the winning votes. 
Figure 1: Determining the proportion of votes received by the candidate of the state 
incumbent party 
 
Note that if votes up to point A are sufficient to win, the election outcome is 
unchanged by the growth advantage but voter margin is still impacted by it.  Likewise, if 
votes up to B lead to a loss, the outcome is once again unaffected by growth though the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
i 
(- ci) 
(- ci) + kc 
A B 1 
Uci 
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voter margin is.  These facts lead to the conclusion that if equation (8‟) is estimated with 
the dependent variable assigned values of 0 and 1 for defeat and victory, respectively, 
versus the proportion of votes received, the fit will be tighter in the latter case.  The 
reason is that in cases of victory, when votes up to point A in Figure 1 are sufficient, 
growth adds nothing to the outcome when the dependent variable is 1 or 0.  But it will 
add to the outcome if the dependent variable is the proportion of votes received.  
Symmetrically, in cases of defeat, if votes up to B lead to a loss, no impact of growth will 
be observed when the dependent variable is 1 or 0.  But not so when it is the proportion 
of votes received. 
4. Estimation 
We now proceed to estimate equation (8‟) using data on candidates nominated by 
state-level incumbent parties.  As previously mentioned, we restrict the sample to 18 
large states, which account for 422 out of the grand total of 543.  A unique feature of our 
analysis, not present in any others to our knowledge, is that we also control for candidate 
specific characteristics relating to age, gender, wealth, education and pending criminal 
cases.  Under the current election laws in India, all candidates contesting an election for 
the Lok Sabha, Rajya Sabha, or state assemblies are required to file an affidavit with the 
Election Commission of India containing information on these characteristics.  We 
painstakingly collected this information and classified the raw data on each of wealth, 
education and pending criminal cases into five categories assigning them values from 0 to 
4.  In each case, 0 represents the lowest category and 4 the highest, as discussed in Table 
A2 in the Appendix. Table A2 in the Appendix provides the data sources from where the 
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data have been extracted, and Table A 3 provides the summary statistics of these 
variables.  
We first estimate the proportion of votes received by the candidate of the 
incumbent party as a function of the relevant variables using our benchmark average 
growth rates, which relate precisely to the period of incumbency and explicitly shown in 
column 4 of Table A1 in the appendix.  Table 2, reports the results.  In the first four 
columns, we estimate linear regressions with percentage of votes being the dependent 
variable and in the last two columns we estimate logit regressions, in which our 
dependent variables takes values of 1 and 0 depending on victory or defeat of the 
candidate of the incumbent party, respectively. 
In column I of Table 2, we estimate the basic model that includes only three 
independent variables: log per capita income at the level of the state in 2003 to control for 
omitted state specific variables; a dummy representing membership in the Congress, the 
main incumbent party at the center; and the average growth in the Gross State Domestic 
Product calculated over the period coinciding with the incumbency period. Results show 
that the candidates proposed by the state incumbent party receive higher share in the total 
votes the higher the growth rate. Each additional percentage point in growth adds 1.4 
percentage points to the vote share of the incumbent candidate.  This is clearly a very 
substantial effect and, in an election with many candidates, can have a decisive effect on 
the outcome. 
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Table 2: Growth and Election Outcomes 
 I II III IV V VI 
Dependent variable Dependent variable is the percent of votes 
received by the candidate of the incumbent 
party 
Dependent variable is 1 
if the candidate of 
incumbent party wins 
election; 0 otherwise 
Log per capita income, 2003 14.7*** 14.2*** 10.0*** 21.5*** 0.12 0.1 
 [11.60] [10.77] [9.37] [8.39] [1.58] [1.32] 
Dummy for Congress party -6.9*** -7.5*** -6.5*** -17.5*** 0.23*** 0.19** 
 [-5.88] [-5.76] [-5.73] [-4.24] [3.13] [2.41] 
Growth of state under the incumbent 1.43*** 1.46***  2.13*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 
 [6.63] [6.57]  [7.21] [4.48] [4.51] 
Dummy=1 if high growth state (-1 if 
low growth, 0 if medium growth) 
  5.18***    
   [7.97]    
Age  -0.01 -0.01 -0.01  0 
  [-0.28] [-0.27] [-0.10]  [-1.46] 
Gender  0.77 0.88 0.11  0.16* 
  [0.39] [0.44] [0.04]  [1.86] 
Wealth index  -0.09 0.22 -0.33  0.03 
  [-0.22] [0.53] [-0.52]  [1.17] 
Education Index  0.68 0.7 0.26  0 
  [1.34] [1.42] [0.40]  [0.03] 
Criminal index   -0.42 -0.32 -0.14  0.01 
  [-0.62] [-0.50] [-0.16]  [0.25] 
Dummy for serious criminal case  0.43 0.44 -0.02  -0.04 
  [0.28] [0.30] [-0.01]  [-0.30] 
Dummy for incumbent candidate  2.13** 1.94** 2.35*  0.04 
  [2.11] [2.00] [1.69]  [0.74] 
Observations 422 409 409 248 422 409 
R-squared 0.244 0.249 0.283 0.293 0.09 0.11 
Note: *, **, *** indicate that the coefficients are significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels 
respectively. Robust t statistics are given in parentheses. Marginal effects from logit regressions 
are presented in columns V and VI. 
 
The addition of candidate characteristics in column II has virtually no impact on 
the contribution growth makes to the vote share: the coefficient rises from 1.43 to 1.46 
with no change in the level of statistical significance. In Column III, we divide the states 
into three groups based on the growth rate: low, medium and high.  We define a variable 
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that takes a value -1 when the state is in the low-growth category, 0 if it is in the medium 
growth category and 1 if it is in the high growth category.  We replace this variable for 
the growth rate in Column III.  The results now look more dramatic: they show that a 
candidate of the state incumbent party in a medium growth states gets a 5.18 percent 
larger vote share than a candidate in the low growth states and similarly a candidate in a 
high growth states gets a 5.30 percent larger vote share than a candidate in a medium 
growth state. Finally, in order to sharpen the results we limit our sample to only the low 
and high growth states and drop the middle third of the states from the sample. The 
coefficient of the variable of interest, the growth rate in the state, in column IV now turns 
much larger. 
In the remaining two columns in Table 2, we estimate logit regressions, using the 
dummy for winning elections as the dependent variable. In column V, per capita income 
and a dummy for congress party are the only other controls in the regressions; and in 
column VI we include the candidate characteristics as additional control. Results show 
that an increase in pre election growth by 1 percent point increases the probability that a 
candidate of the state incumbent party wins election by 5 to 6 percentage points.  
Candidate characteristics are generally not statistically significant.  
As seen in Table 2, and we will further see it in Table 3 and 4, the number of 
observations fluctuates across regressions. While our sample consists of 422 candidates, 
the regressions that include candidates‟ characteristics are estimated with fewer 
observations principally because the data for education is missing for about 13 
observations. Out of these 13 observations, data for wealth is missing for 1 observation. 
In addition, data is missing for fiscal deficit for Goa for 2008-09. Thus when we include 
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the full set of candidate characteristics we can estimate the regressions with 409 
observations and when we include fiscal deficit variable as well there are 408 
observations. As a robustness test we estimate all of our regressions with the smallest 
sample of 408 observations and none of the results change. 
Our next step is to check if the effect of growth on election outcomes varies 
according to per capita income of the state, affiliation with the Congress party and 
candidate incumbency at the center.  The introduction of interaction terms between the 
average growth of the state during incumbency on the one hand and the state per capita 
income, dummy for membership in the Congress and the dummy for incumbency in the 
parliament in columns I, II and III in Table 3 accomplishes this task.   
A key result from columns I to III in Table 3 is that the incumbent state 
government's candidates benefits from growth more the lower the per-capita income in 
the state.  This result follows from the fact that the coefficient of the interaction between 
growth during the incumbent‟s regime and per capita income is negative and statistically 
significant in all three columns.  This is quite a remarkable result: voters in the poorer 
states value a given growth rate more than those in richer states.  The results in columns 
II and III also show that the growth dividend is larger for the candidates of the Indian 
national congress since the coefficient of the relevant interaction term is positive and 
significant.  This result suggests some synergy between incumbency at the state and 
central level when the state government performs well.  Finally, the sitting MPs reap no 
additional growth dividend as shown by the coefficient of the relevant interaction term 
being statistically insignificant. 
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Table 3: Including the Interaction Effects and Fiscal Deficit 
 I II III IV V VI 
Log per capita income, 2003 20.8*** 25.0*** 25.1*** 15.6*** 15.3*** 24.7*** 
  [6.29] [7.00] [6.87] [13.00] [12.13] [6.72] 
Dummy for Congress party -6.17*** -36.5*** -36.5*** -6.7*** -7.4*** -30.2*** 
  [-4.27] [-4.02] [-4.02] [-5.72] [-5.78] [-3.15] 
Growth of state under the incumbent 8.1*** 13.6*** 13.6*** 1.4*** 1.4*** 12.1*** 
 [2.61] [3.71] [3.65] [6.41] [6.38] [3.23] 
Change in state fiscal deficit (2008-07)    -1.59*** -1.54*** -1.16** 
    [-3.03] [-2.80] [-2.06] 
Growth Variable*log per capita income -0.73** -1.35*** -1.35***   -1.18*** 
  [-2.17] [-3.38] [-3.30]   [-2.88] 
Growth variable*dummy for congress  3.43*** 3.43***   2.71** 
  [3.24] [3.24]   [2.44] 
Growth variable*dummy for incumbent 
candidate 
  0.03   0.04 
   [0.07]   [0.08] 
Age -0.02 -0.01 -0.01  -0.02 -0.02 
  [-0.44] [-0.30] [-0.30]  [-0.39] [-0.39] 
Gender 0.78 0.8 0.8  0.55 0.62 
  [0.40] [0.41] [0.41]  [0.28] [0.32] 
Wealth index -0.1 -0.19 -0.19  0.14 0 
 [-0.24] [-0.45] [-0.46]  [0.33] [0.00] 
Education Index 0.71 0.66 0.66  0.58 0.6 
 [1.41] [1.33] [1.33]  [1.15] [1.21] 
Criminal index  -0.47 -0.28 -0.27  -0.35 -0.26 
  [-0.70] [-0.41] [-0.41]  [-0.52] [-0.39] 
Dummy for serious criminal case 0.72 0.56 0.55  0.28 0.46 
  [0.46] [0.36] [0.36]  [0.18] [0.30] 
Dummy for incumbent candidate 2.18** 2.04** 1.8  1.89* 1.59 
 [2.16] [2.03] [0.50]  [1.84] [0.44] 
Observations 409 409 409 421 408 408 
R-squared 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.27 
Note: *, **, *** indicate that the coefficients are significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels 
respectively. Robust t statistics are given in parentheses.  
 
 In the last three columns of Table 3 we include the change in the state fiscal 
deficit, as a percentage of state gross domestic product, in 2008 over 2007 in the 
benchmark regressions considered in Table 2.  Results in column IV, V and VI show that 
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an increase in fiscal deficit in the election year is associated negatively with the vote 
share for the incumbents.  There remains the possibility of reverse causality here since 
the incumbent parties expecting to lose may well choose to increase spending in a last-
ditch effort prior to the election. This result mirrors one of the results in Brender and 
Drazen. 
We next conduct robustness checks by adjusting the period over which the growth 
rates associated with incumbency are calculated.  In column I, we reproduce the 
benchmark case when the growth rate is calculated over the exact years of incumbency 
for each state.  In column II, we choose a longer period as shown in column 5 of 
appendix Table A1.  Finally, in Column III, the growth rate is the average of the growth 
rates in 2007 and 2008.   The last of these cases is in the spirit of Kramer who argues that 
the collection of information is costly so that voters take into account the economic 
performance only during the years immediately preceding the elections.  
In columns IV and V of Table 4, we replace the absolute growth rate of the state 
by its deviation from the national average during the years identified with incumbency in 
each case. None of the variations in Table 4 change our basic results. We also note that 
replacing the average of growth rates during 2007 and 2008 by its deviation from the 
national average will not alter any of the results since the common average growth rate 
would simply be absorbed by the constant term.  
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Table 4: Including Different Measures of Growth 
 
 I II III IV V 
Log per capita income, 2003 14.2*** 12.4*** 13.1*** 12.9*** 12.9*** 
  [10.77] [10.95] [12.03] [9.62] [10.76] 
Dummy for Congress party -7.45*** -4.51*** -4.78*** -5.29*** -5.49*** 
 [-5.76] [-3.99] [-4.28] [-4.50] [-4.81] 
Growth (exact incumbency years) 1.46***     
 [6.57]     
Growth (longer period, column 5, Table A1)  1.39***    
  [6.67]    
Growth (2007 and 2008 only)   2.02***   
   [7.55]   
State‟s growth minus national growth over 
the exact years of incumbency 
   1.18***  
    [4.59]  
State‟s growth minus the national growth 
over the longer period (column 5, Table A1) 
    1.44*** 
     [6.11] 
Age -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 [-0.28] [-0.29] [-0.29] [-0.12] [-0.21] 
Gender 0.77 0.93 0.75 0.97 0.97 
 [0.39] [0.48] [0.39] [0.49] [0.49] 
Wealth index -0.09 -0.14 0.03 -0.25 -0.22 
 [-0.22] [-0.33] [0.06] [-0.57] [-0.53] 
Criminal Index -0.42 -0.48 -0.02 -0.21 -0.41 
 [-0.62] [-0.71] [-0.04] [-0.29] [-0.60] 
Education Index 0.68 0.85* 0.79 0.74 0.86* 
 [1.34] [1.69] [1.56] [1.44] [1.69] 
Dummy for serious criminal case 0.43 0.29 -0.52 -0.27 0.1 
  [0.28] [0.20] [-0.36] [-0.17] [0.07] 
Dummy for incumbent candidate 2.13** 2.37** 2.02** 2.17** 2.40** 
 [2.11] [2.31] [2.00] [2.04] [2.31] 
Observations 409 409 409 409 409 
R-squared 0.249 0.251 0.253 0.204 0.242 
Note: *, **, *** indicate that the coefficients are significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels 
respectively. Robust t statistics are given in parentheses.  
 
Without reporting the detailed results, we note here that we also checked for 
several additional variables that may impact the outcomes but our key results remain 
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unaffected.  For example, we interact the growth variable with various constituency 
specific variables such as the literacy rate, percent of population below the poverty line, 
percent of rural population and the percent of workforce in the primary sector (agriculture 
and mining and quarrying).  We also introduce dummy variables for constituencies 
reserved for the Scheduled castes and Scheduled Tribes, and their interactions with 
growth variables. The results turn out to be statistically insignificant for all these 
variables except literacy, which is somewhat difficult to interpret. Moreover, literacy is 
also highly correlated with per capita income as reflected in the fact that its inclusion 
turns per capita income variable insignificant.  
Our final robustness checks relate to replacing characteristics of the candidate of the 
incumbent party by the deviations of these characteristics from those of the average of the 
characteristics of the top four candidates out of the remaining ones. In this exercise, the 
interpretation of age is straightforward. For other variables such as education, wealth and 
pending criminal cases, we employ the index of the candidate of the incumbent party 
minus the average of the index value for the top four candidates other than the candidate 
of the state incumbent party. For the dummy for serious charges, the average is taken 
over the candidates who have at least one charge. Results show that the coefficient of the 
growth variable is robust to these modifications.  In some cases, the candidate 
characteristics variables, when taken in the deviation form, turn significant.  These 
include, age, wealth and education. In the deviation form, all of these variables have a 
positive and significant coefficient, implying that the candidates of the incumbent state 
government parties who are older than the other top candidates, are wealthier or are more 
educated are able to attract a larger vote share.  
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5. Concluding Remarks 
This paper provides the first example of a developing country in which growth has 
statistically significant and quantitatively large impact on the election prospects of the 
candidates of the incumbent party.  The finding is plausible since it is precisely in the 
poor countries that the masses are likely to react to the gains from high levels of growth.  
It is also consistent with and reinforces the finding in Brender and Drazen that in a cross-
country analysis, growth helps the incumbent heads of states to win reelection. 
We note that our finding has also been reflected in some recent key state-level 
elections.  Chief Ministers of such poor states as Bihar and Orissa, who have catalyzed 
extremely rapid growth, have been returned to office with overwhelming majorities.  On 
the other hand, the Marxist government in West Bengal, which ruled the state for over 
two decades and had seemed invincible, was recently handed a humiliating defeat by the 
electorate in recognition of its poor delivery in relation to many other states and the 
national average. 
Finally, we note a possible qualification to our finding.  We cannot rule out the 
possibility that growth is correlated with other attributes that the voters value.  Superior 
growth performance, for instance, may accompany good governance including law and 
order to which voters attach greater value than growth itself.  Rapid growth may also be 
associated with larger reductions in poverty, which may be a vote winner.  Therefore, it is 
possible to argue that the voters may be rewarding delivery on other attributes rather than 
growth.  We believe, however, that from the policy perspective, this is not a serious issue.  
Even if the other attributes are what the voters value and not growth per se, the latter can 
serve as a reasonable target variable for the state politicians to win the elections.  
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Appendix Table A1: Incumbency Years and Average Growth rates across States 
State Year of 
Incumbe
ncy 
Main Incumbent Party I: Growth rate 
averaged over 
the years  
II:  Growth rate 
averaged over 
the years 
Average 
growth rate 
in case I 
Average 
growth rate 
in case II 
Average 
growth rate 
in 2007-08 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Andhra Pradesh 2004 Indian National Congress 2005-2008 2005-2008 9.30 7.44 7.90 
Bihar 2005 JDU, Bhartiya Janata Party 2006-2008 2006-2008 15.96 15.96 12.68 
Chhattisgarh 2003 Bhartiya Janata Party 2004-2008 2004-2008 9.69 9.69 9.26 
Delhi 2003 Indian National Congress 2004-2008 2004- 2008 12.17 12.17 11.45 
Goa 2007 Indian National Congress 2008 2004-2008** 11.14 10.76 11.14 
Gujarat 2007 Bhartiya Janata Party 2008 2004-2008** 7.21 10.22 9.85 
Himachal Pradesh 2007 Bhartiya Janata Party 2008 2008 7.44 7.44 8.01 
Haryana 2005 Indian National Congress 2006- 2008 2006- 2008 10.14 10.14 8.72 
Kerala 2006 Communist Party of India, Marxist 2007-2008 2006- 2008* 8.39 9.12 8.39 
Maharashtra 2004 Indian National Congress, 
National Congress Party  
2005- 2008 2004-2008** 8.77 8.76 6.74 
Madhya Pradesh 2003 Bhartiya Janata Party 2004- 2008 2004-2008 6.62 6.62 7.66 
Orissa 2004 Biju Janata Dal 2005- 2008 2004-2008** 9.43 10.18 8.93 
Punjab 2007 Siromani Akali Dal 2008 2007-2008* 6.40 6.64 6.64 
Rajasthan 2003 Bhartiya Janata Party 2004- 2008 2004-2008 6.88 6.88 7.84 
Tamil Nadu 2006 Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam 2007-2008 2006-2008* 4.48 6.75 4.48 
Uttarakhand 2007 Bhartiya Janata Party 2008 2007- 2008* 5.83 8.07 8.07 
Uttar Pradesh 2007 Bajuhan Samaj Party 2008 2007-2008* 7.21 7.58 7.58 
West Bengal 2006 Communist Party of India, Marxist 2007- 2008 2004-2008** 7.50 7.33 7.50 
 
*Election were held in March/May 2006, hence we include growth rate in 2006 
** The same party was in the government in the previous term, hence the average calculated over five years. 
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Appendix Table A2: Description and Data Sources of Variables 
 
Variable Source Description 
% of Votes Obtained Election 
Commission 
 
Per Capita Income, Log Central Statistical 
Organization 
 
Growth in State Domestic 
Product 
Central Statistical 
Organization 
The growth rates are calculated using the GSDP data 
at 1999-2000 prices, from the CSO‟s website, 
accessed on September 14, 2011. 
Change In Fiscal Deficit  Fiscal deficit of state is measured as percent of 
state domestic product. The change is in the value 
of this variable in FY 2008-09, over 2007-08 
Age Election 
Commission 
In years  
Gender dummy Election 
Commission 
Dummy takes a value 1 if the candidate is a 
female 
Education Index Election 
Commission 
The index takes a value 0 if the candidates has no 
formal education, 1 if he has formal education till 
grade 5; 2 if the education is up to high school; 3 
if education is up to undergraduate; and 4 for 
education level higher than undergraduate, 
including a technical or professional degree. 
Wealth Index Election 
Commission 
The index takes a value 0 if the candidate 
declared wealth is upto ½ million rupees, 1 if it is 
between ½ and 5 million rupees, 2 if the wealth is 
between 5 and 9 million rupees, 3 if it is between 
9 and 50 million rupees and 4 if it is more than 50 
million rupees. 
Criminal index Election 
Commission and 
Association for 
Democratic 
Reforms 
The index takes a value 0 if the candidate has no 
criminal cases against him, 1 if he has 1 criminal 
case against him, 2 if he has 2-4 cases against 
him, 3 if he has 5-9 cases against him and 4 if he 
has more than 9 cases against him.  
Dummy for Serious cases Association for 
Democratic 
Reforms 
Dummy which takes a value 1 if the candidate 
faces at least one serious criminal charge under 
sections 302, 307, 364, 379 and other sections, 
levied for charges such as murder, intent to 
murder and theft. 
Incumbent MP Various sources on 
the web 
Dummy which takes a value 1 if the candidate 
was a member of the previous Lok Sabha.  
Belonging to India 
National Congress (INC) 
Election 
Commission 
Dummy which take a value 1 if the candidate 
belonged to India National Congress Party 
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Appendix Table A3: Summary Statistics of Variables 
 
Variable Observations Average Minimum Maximum 
Percent of Votes Obtained 422 39.06 0.54 78.80 
Per Capita Income, Log 422 9.75 8.82 10.81 
Belonging to INC 422 0.20 0 1 
Age 422 52.40 28 88 
Gender Dummy 422 0.10 0 1 
Wealth Index 421 2.38 0 4 
Education Index 409 3.22 0 4 
Criminal Index 422 0.46 0 4 
Dummy for Serious cases 422 0.12 0 1 
Incumbent MP 422 0.37 0 1 
Growth (exact incumbency years) 422 8.56 4.48 15.96 
Growth (longer period, column 5, Table A1) 422 8.83 6.62 15.96 
Growth (2007 and 2008 only) 422 8.21 4.48 12.68 
Change in state fiscal deficit (2008-07) 421 1.08 -0.34 4.46 
 
